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INCORPORATION MAY NOT MEAN SOPHISTICATION:
SHOULD THERE BE A SUITABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR
BANKS SELLING DERIVATIVES TO CORPORATIONS?
JASON M. ROSENTHAL,*
INTRODUCTION
Bankers Trust Company recently reached a settlement agreement
with Gibson Greetings, Inc., an international manufacturer of greet-
ings cards, whereby it will bear a $14 million loss from derivative in-
vestments.1 The settlement comes several months after Gibson
Greetings sued Bankers Trust, a pioneer in the use of derivatives, in
federal district court for losses suffered investing in high-risk deriva-
tive securities, relying on advice from Bankers Trust.2 Among its
complaints, Gibson Greetings alleged the bank did not consider the
corporation's best interests as an unsophisticated investor.3 Although
it had dealt in derivatives before, Gibson Greetings premised this alle-
gation on the facts that these previous dealings were limited in scope,
that it advised Bankers Trust of its unwillingness to speculate, and that
it "justifiably believed that it had entered into a special relationship of
trust and confidence with Bankers Trust." 4
This represents the first time a corporation has sued for losses
suffered from an over-the-counter derivatives transaction;5 that is, one
conducted through the broad market of brokers dealing securities by
telephone or computer, rather than through the facilities of a securi-
ties exchange. While the case did not actually go to trial, it raises con-
cerns over the soliciting of derivative securities not only to individual
* J.D. Candidate 1997, Chicago-Kent College Of Law; B.S. Finance, Indiana University.
1. See Steve Lipin, Gibson Greetings Reaches Accord in Suit Against Bankers Trust Over
Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1994, at A2.
2. See id. Gibson Greetings sought recovery under a theory of misrepresentation, alleging
Bankers Trust took advantage of the company by not accurately disclosing the risk involved in
the securities transaction. See id.
3. See id.
4. Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or Shorn
Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 366 (1995) (quoting Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. Bankers Trust
Co., Civ. No. 1-94-620 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 1994)).
5. Even more recently, Bankers Trust settled a derivatives-related dispute with Air Prod-
ucts & Chemicals, Inc., agreeing to pay $67 million to a disgruntled derivatives client. See
Timothy L. O'Brien, Bankers Trust Pays $67 Million to Settle Derivatives Dispute with Chemical
Firm, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at A8.
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investors, but to major corporations investing substantial assets in
these high-risk securities.
In a related case, Procter and Gamble ("P&G") also filed suit
against Bankers Trust, alleging it induced P&G to enter into interest
rate swaps 6 by negligently providing false information. 7 P&G also
sued under a theory of breach of fiduciary duty.8 This theory alleg-
edly arose from Bankers Trust's promise that P&G could accurately
rely on its advice concerning swap transactions, and that this promise,
along with P&G's reliance on this promise, gave rise to a fiduciary
duty which Bankers Trust breached.9 The two parties recently agreed
to settle out of court, and Bankers Trust has "agree[d] to absorb as
much as $150 million" in losses that P&G suffered on the interest rate
swaps.10
Traditionally, the financial world considered corporations" such
as these to be among the most sophisticated investors, requiring no
regulatory protection. 12 Initially, regulators designed suitability rules
to protect investors with "little financial know-how."'1 3 Such suitabil-
ity rules are designed to ensure that customers buy the "right" prod-
ucts given their financial goals, and the rules shift this responsibility
from the clients to the brokers themselves.' 4 The rules provide that a
broker may recommend a security to a client only if it conforms to the
client's investment objectives, as determined by information obtained
by the dealer. 15
6. Interest rate swaps involve a contractual agreement to exchange a package of interest-
rate forward contracts with another party. See Donald L. Horwitz, Derivatives, I: The Basics on
Terms and Risks, Bus L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 42.
7. See Conrad G. Bahlke, Theories of Liability in Derivatives Litigation: Misrepresenta-
tion, Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Contract and Lack of Suitability, §§ I.A.2, B.2 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7110, 1995).
8. Fiduciary duty is defined as "[a] duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordi-
nating one's personal interests to that of the other person," and it is the "highest standard of
duty implied by law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
9. See Bahlke, supra note 7, § I.C.2.
10. Laurie Hays, Bankers Trust Settles Dispute With P&G, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1996, at
A3.
11. A "corporation" is defined as "[a]n artificial person or legal entity created by or under
the authority of the laws of a state." BLACK's LAW DICTnONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990).
12. See Unsuitable: It is Wrong to Protect Companies and Professional Investors from the
Consequences of their Own Actions, ECONoMIsT, Dec. 3, 1994, at 18. See also Marc Levy, Note,
Japanese and U.S. Financial Derivatives Markets: Recommendations for Loosening Japan's
Tightly Regulated Market, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1970, 1999 n.198 (1995).
13. Unsuitable, supra note 12, at 18.
14. Id. Some suitability rules might require dealers to justify to regulators each transaction
they make. See id.
15. See Ernest T. Patrikis et al., Derivatives Activities of Banking Organizations: Initiative
for Supervision and Enhanced Disclosure, § II.A.1 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. B4-7123, 1995).
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Most banks, viewing corporations as sophisticated entities and
thus unneeding of this protection, presumed that corporations pos-
sessed the ability to make their own informed decisions about whether
or not a particular security or derivative was suitable for them.16 In
fact, corporations have actually argued for deregulation in this area
over the course of the past few years. In the aftermath of the Bankers
Trust cases, however, and the continuing development of more com-
plex derivative securities, regulators are taking a new look at whether
or not corporations are in need of protection.17
This Note examines the need for such protection from derivative
investments sold by banks. Part I of the Note provides a brief over-
view of derivatives and the functions they serve in the financial arena.
This introduction specifically addresses the use of derivatives by cor-
porations. These securities play an important role in the day-to-day
operations of corporations and managements' ability to hedge against
the many risks associated with conducting business both in the United
States and abroad.
Part II discusses the current legislation in this area, which consists
mostly of administrative regulations (e.g., the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). Although
several of these regulations provide some type of suitability protec-
tion, they are not industry-wide standards applicable to all dealers, but
rather affect only specific sectors of the industry-mainly those deal-
ers belonging to the self-regulatory organization responsible for the
regulation. The Office of the Comptroller, which regulates banking
activity, enacted similar regulations which apply directly to banks sell-
ing derivatives. These regulations, while not designed as suitability
rules, create incentives for banks to provide customers with adequate
protection when buying derivative securities.
The focus in Part III shifts to proposed regulatory alternatives
applicable to dealers selling derivatives, including banks. These alter-
natives cover a broad spectrum. They range from shifting the full bur-
den of determining suitability to the dealer, to advocating a traditional
arm's length standard in which dealers may assume customers are so-
phisticated enough to enter the transaction without any protection.
Part IV analyzes what direction these regulations should take in
regard to their applicability to corporate end-users of derivatives. The
16. See generally id.
17. No per se "common-law cause of action [exists] for a broker-dealer's failure to make a
suitability determination." Id. § II.A.2.
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conclusion reached from an examination of the proffered alternatives
suggests an environment absent of strict regulation in the form of suit-
ability rules. This is because of the complexity of applying a uniform
standard to the very diverse group of corporations employing the use
of derivatives, and the fact that many corporations are unwilling to
pay for added protection. Instead, a better alternative is a free market
approach. Under this scenario parties may, at their option, contract
for the appropriate level of investment services and advice. This al-
lows those unwilling to pay for additional protection the free will to
continue using derivatives at their discretion, while at the same time
leaving more unsophisticated parties the opportunity to seek addi-
tional investment advice.
I. THE USE OF DERIVATIVES IN THE FINANCIAL ARENA
Derivatives have recently become an important tool in the man-
agement of the daily risks encountered by major corporations. Never-
theless, many executives utilize derivatives either for speculative
purposes, or without full knowledge of their potential impact on the
corporation. As will be shown, derivatives do serve an important
function when used to reduce risk, but when used improperly only
serve to both create new risk and increase existing risk.
Derivative securities are thus named because they "derive" their
value from an underlying financial asset.18 Explained in basic terms,
such an investment is essentially a "bet" as to how the particular un-
derlying asset will perform over time. 19 While this may sound simple
enough, over twelve hundred types of derivatives exist today, many
formulated by "financial laypersons" with doctorates in mathematics
and physics.20 They take on names such as "death-backed bonds,"
"inverse floaters," and "heaven and hell bonds."' 21 Some are so com-
18. See Geoffrey B. Goldman, Note, Crafting a Suitability Requirement for the Sale of Over-
the-Counter Derivatives: Should Regulators "Punish the Wall Street Hounds of Greed"?, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1112, 1112 (1995).
19. 60 Minutes: Derivatives (CBS television broadcast, July 23, 1995).
20. Id. The 60 Minutes broadcast describes the formulation of these new, complex deriva-
tives as "the financial equivalent of genetic engineering." Id. An example of one such derivative
is the following: "CPN Rate 4.3 to 2/95; 6.22% to 2/96; 7.8% to 2/97; Thereafter @ 11%/6mo
$LIBOR. Call only if 6MO $LIBOR = 5/5%. Stepped inverse 6MO $LIBOR/Linked 'IAN'."
Id.
21. Markham, supra note 4, at 353.
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plex that not even industry experts can discern their purpose or calcu-
late expected gains and losses.22
The use of derivatives "ha[s] grown rapidly [in] the past ten
years."'23 In 1994, they accounted for twenty percent of the profits of
the brokerage houses and investment banking firms selling these se-
curities. 24 The amount of outstanding derivatives in the over-the-
counter market alone is estimated to be at least $12 trillion.2 5
Derivatives can be grouped into two broad types of invest-
ments.2 6 A forward-based contract involves a promise by one party to
buy a specified quantity of an underlying asset, at a specified price, on
a specified date, from the other party.27 An option-based contract, on
the other hand, gives the buyer the choice of purchasing or not
purchasing the underlying asset at a specified price on a specified
date.28 Just as two basic types of derivatives exist, there are two estab-
lished mediums of purchasing them.29 Exchange-based derivatives
trade on established financial exchanges, and are subject to "fairly
comprehensive regulation, ' 30 while over-the-counter ("OTC") deriva-
tives are often customized to meet the needs of the parties involved in
the transaction.31
Whether or not a derivative is suitable for a corporation depends,
in part, on the intended use of that derivative.32 While many purchase
derivatives solely with speculation in mind, derivatives were originally
designed, and serve an increasingly important role, for corporations
"hedging" certain day-to-day risks.33 By purchasing the appropriate
22. See 60 Minutes: Derivatives, supra note 19. Jim Grant, a Financial Analyst appearing on
60 Minutes, when asked to explain what the derivative formula found in footnote 20 meant,
responded that he did not understand it. Id.
23. Senior Deputy Comptroller for Capital Markets Douglas E. Harris, Remarks Before
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Barcelona, Spain (March 23, 1995), re-
printed in Bahlke, supra note 7, at Exhibit C.
24. See 60 Minutes: Derivatives, supra note 19.
25. See id. The actual estimation is somewhere between $12 trillion and $35 trillion. See
Markham, supra note 4, at 353.
26. See Horwitz, supra note 6, at 38.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 42.
29. See Goldman, supra note 18, at 1118.
30. Id. The bulk of this regulation comes from the Futures Trading Commission and the
Securities Exchange Commission. See id.
31. See id. The flexibility feature of OTC derivatives has consequently made these instru-
ments more complex, and hence more difficult to regulate. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Fi-
nance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEx. L. REV. 985, 1013-14 (1995).
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derivatives, corporations can essentially lock in otherwise variable
market rates.34
An example of the relevance of this function is explicitly pro-
vided in P&G's 1994 annual report, in which it states that the com-
pany "is subject to market rate risk from exposure to changes in
interest rates and currency exchange rates and enters into various fi-
nancial instrument transactions to manage these exposures. '35 For ex-
ample, because the company's financing and cash management
activities are vulnerable to interest rate changes, P&G "utilizes inter-
est rate swaps, 36 including foreign currency interest rate swaps, that
have the effect of converting specific debt obligations of the Company
from fixed to variable rate, or vice versa, as required. ' 37 Additionally,
in order to manage the risk resulting from exposure to fluctuations in
currency exchange rates, P&G utilizes foreign currency swaps38 as
well as forward exchange contracts and options.39
When used properly, derivatives give corporate managers the
ability to control and transfer certain variable risks,40 thereby allowing
them to determine to some degree the market environment in which
they will do business.41 This is an increasingly important function in
today's global economy because, by providing a wide array of risk
management tools, derivatives allow for the effective allocation of
34. See id. at 1014. As an example, a corporation wishing to insure against an increase in
the interest rate can buy a derivative whose value is tied to that rate. Thus, while a rise in the
interest rate may increase the corporation's cost of doing business, that increased cost will be
offset by a corresponding increase in the value of the derivative security. See Interview with
Corey L. Fisher, Independent Trader, Rand Financial Services, in Chicago, 111. (Nov. 14, 1995).
35. PROCTER & GAMBLE CO., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1995).
36. In such a transaction, "one party agrees to pay another a floating rate of interest on a
I.. 'notional' amount of principal for a specified period of time; in return, it receives a... fixed
rate of interest on the same amount of... principal for the same period of time." John C.
Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users, 112 BANKING L.J. 638, 639 (1995). It
should be noted that the parties do not make the actual full interest payments to one another,
but rather simply exchange the net gain or loss. See id.
37. PROCTER & GAMBLE, supra note 35, at 10.
38. See id. The primary purpose of a foreign currency swap is to hedge against the risks
associated with changes in foreign exchange rates. See Christopher L. Craig, Comment, The
Appropriate Income Tax Treatment for the Assignment of Notional Principal Contracts, 36 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 797, 797 n.3 (1992).
39. See PROCTER & GAMBLE, supra note 35, at 11-12. "The impact of the changes in the
value of these instruments typically offsets changes in the value of the underlying transactions."
Id. at 12.
40. See Horwitz, supra note 6, at 45.
41. See David B. Weinberger et al., Using Derivatives: What Senior Managers Must Know,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 33, 37.
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credit and sharing of risk, leading to lowered "cost[s] of capital forma-
tion and stimulat[ion of] economic growth. '42
Aside from the ordinary risk of the devaluation of derivatives,
there is another major concern which must be addressed when dealing
in derivatives. This is the problem of valuing derivatives. Most securi-
ties are traded on major markets (e.g., NYSE, NASDAQ), and thus
price quotations are readily available and tend to reflect the current,
up-to-the-minute price. The derivatives market is much smaller
though, partly because many investments are designed to suit the par-
ticular parties' needs.43 This not only makes these investments highly
illiquid, but also makes them difficult to price." Thus, end-users45 are
often unable to obtain price quotes or even reliable estimates of
value. 46 As a result, end-users are heavily reliant on their dealers to
provide them with accurate pricing information and, therefore, may
not be able to monitor their positions effectively in order to control
loss. 4 7
Reliance on dealer valuation poses an additional concern. At
many firms, traders are directly responsible for pricing a derivative's
market value.48 This structure allows for potential conflicts of inter-
est, because a trader's compensation is often tied to the securities in
which they invest.49
Although end-users often inherit a great deal of risk when invest-
ing in derivatives, they are not the only parties in such transactions to
experience risk. Derivatives dealers themselves are also subject to a
multitude of risks. For example, "operational risk" refers to the "risk
of loss associated with human error; miscommunication or fraud; man-
agement or system failure; or inadequate procedures and controls." 50
42. Donald L. Horwitz & Robert J. Mackay, Derivatives: State of the Debate, Oct. 1995, at
7.
43. See Interview with Earl Cromwell, JATOR Investments, in Highland Park, Illinois (Oct.
15, 1995).
44. See id.
45. An end-user is generally the party seeking to initiate the transaction, and the one who
will ultimately be required to buy or sell a given asset. See Thomas C. Singher, Note, Regulating
Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable Alternative to Congres-
sional Action?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1397, 1403 (1995).
46. See Harris, supra note 23.
47. See Bruce A. Baird et al., Derivatives, II: What are the Obligations of Dealers and End-
users?, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 40, 46.
48. See Michael R. Sesit, Study Sees Gap in Oversight of Derivatives, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Sept. 19, 1995, at 13.
49. See id.
50. Herbert S. Wander et al., Derivatives Legislation: Guidelines for Developing Internal
Controls to Manage Derivatives, § I.D (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B4-7111, 1995).
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This risk may be especially prevalent when dealing with derivatives
because of the complex transactions which are likely to occur.51 An-
other type of risk is "reputational risk," or the risk that dealers may
lose part of their client base due to a perception that they cannot ef-
fectively manage derivative transactions. 52 Additional risks include
"liquidity risk," in the event the dealer is unable to meet its funding
requirements for derivatives transactions, and "legal risk," which is
simply the risk that a transaction is not valid or enforceable as a mat-
ter of law.53
Although the risks to dealers and customers are plentiful, deriva-
tives remain an important business tool used to effectively manage
even greater risks (such as fluctuations in currency exchange rates,
inflation, etc.). Because of their risk-hedging benefits when used
properly, corporations will continue to use derivatives. Yet even as
the use and importance of derivatives grow, little regulation exists as
to their sale.
II. CURRENT LEGISLATION REGULATING THE SALE
OF DERIVATIVES
For the past several years there has been a "steady and dramatic"
increase in the institutionalization of derivatives markets.5 4 The domi-
nance of institutional investors led to a call for reduced regulation of
the financial markets.5 5 Arguments were made that these institutions
were too sophisticated to be subjected to the regulation designed to
protect the average investor.5 6 Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") Regulators responded to these requests by removing much
of the regulations as applied to these institutional investors. 57 As a
result, the "primary" gap in the structure of securities regulation con-
cerns the "inapplicability of suitability rules" to, and the "lack of
51. See id.
52. See id. § I.E. This risk can also affect the ability of the dealer to attract new clients. See
id.
53. See id. § I.H-I.
54. Markham, supra note 4, at 350. Institutional investors are normally said to include large
commercial firms and wealthy individuals maintaining the ability, or the capital to retain third-
party advisors, to adequately assess the risks involved in complex investments. See id. at 346 n.1.
55. See id. at 353.
56. See id. at 353-54. Much of this initial regulation arose after the Stock Market Crash of
1929, and was designed to "protect [the type of] unsophisticated investor[ ... who had been...
badly damaged" by that Crash. Id. at 354.
57. See id. The justifications for this reduced regulation included increased market effi-
ciency, and the basic presumption that institutional investors possess the ability to determine
what information is needed to make an informed investment decision. See id. at 357-58.
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[comprehensive] regulation" of, dealer banks selling derivatives to in-
stitutional investors.58
Despite the substantial losses realized by derivatives end-users,
Congress has been slow to develop comprehensive legislation regulat-
ing the sale of derivatives.5 9 Instead, much of this responsibility has
fallen on the shoulders of administrative agencies. Even so, these
agencies focus on assuring that dealers obtain and disclose the neces-
sary information concerning the risks of derivatives, instead of requir-
ing some evidence that ensures a derivative transaction is suitable for
the customer.60 Even in cases where regulators have attempted to
classify certain derivatives as securities, thereby subjecting them to
broad SEC regulations, Wall Street innovators have countered such
action by devising even more sophisticated financial instruments that
do not fall under the established definition of "security. ' '61 As a re-
sult, the regulation that currently exists consists of a patchwork of pri-
vate obligations and narrow public law.
In light of the settlement between Gibson Greetings and Bankers
Trust discussed above, 62 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York be-
came the first organization to take direct action against an individual
derivatives dealer.63 Under an agreement with the Federal Reserve
Bank, Bankers Trust agreed to several provisions in regards to the sale
of leveraged derivative transactions. 64 While the agreement falls short
of a suitability requirement, one that would shift responsibility for de-
termining the appropriateness of a client's derivatives transactions en-
tirely to the dealer, it requires Bankers Trust to ensure that each end-
user maintain the capacity to comprehend the terms and risks of the
transaction; and to disclose to each of its clients such information as
would be vital to that comprehension. 65 Also, because of the depen-
dence derivative customers have on their dealers to provide price val-
uations, Bankers Trust must regularly provide end-users with
58. John Duncan & Mary Jo Quinn, Regulatory Outlook, BANK Ac-r. & FIN., Summer
1995, at 43, 45.
59. See Baird et al., supra note 47, at 40.
60. See id. at 47. It should be noted that some regulation does exist, but this deals mostly
with fraudulent conduct on the part of derivatives dealers. See id.
61. See Singher, supra note 45, at 1401 n.26. A complete definition of "security" may be
found at 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1996).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 1-13.
63. See Baird, supra note 47, at 46.
64. See id. A leveraged derivatives transaction is one in which the value of the derivative
rises or falls faster than the underlying asset from which it is derived. See id.
65. See Patrikis, supra note 15, § III.B (citing Written Agreement By and Among Bankers
Trust New York Corporation et al., at 3-7 (Dec. 5, 1994)).
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indicative quotes and other related information, including disclosure
of the basis for these valuations.66
While these rules apply only to Bankers Trust, other broad reach-
ing regulations exist that apply to all derivatives dealers. For example,
the Securities Exchange Act of 193467 requires derivative dealers to
join a self-regulatory organization ("SRO"). 68 These SROs, which
have "substantial enforcement authority," impose additional regula-
tions on their member organizations. 69 Among the significant regula-
tions, many SROs have formulated suitability, or "know thy
customer" rules, which apply to their members.70 For example, article
III, section 2 of the National Association of Securities Dealers'
("NASD") Rules of Fair Practice states that "in recommending to a
customer the purchase, sale, or exchange of any security, a member
shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation
is suitable for such customer" based upon facts disclosed by the cus-
tomer regarding "his other security holdings and as to his financial
situation and needs."'71 While the rule does not specify information
that must be collected by dealers in regards to noninstitutional cus-
tomers, dealers still must obtain sufficient information on which to
justify their suitability determination. 72
Banks, however, remain the major players in derivatives deal-
ing,73 and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and
the Federal Reserve regulate bank activities. 74 In 1993, the OCC took
the first step in addressing the issue of appropriateness of derivatives
66. See id. The other information includes the material terms and risk of the derivative
transactions, along with sensitivity analyses illustrating the range of outcomes at maturity. See
id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1994).
68. See Bahlke, supra note 7, § II.A.
69. Duncan & Quinn, supra note 58, at 44.
70. See Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae
in Contemporary Securities Transactions, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 309 (1994) (quoting New York
Stock Exchange Rule 405 and National Association of Securities Dealers Rules of Fair Practice,
art. III, § 2(a)).
71. Robert L.D. Colby et al., Current Issues: Obligations of Broker-Dealers in Public Fi-
nance Offerings, Confirmation Disclosure, and Suitability, (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7119, 1995).
72. See id., § I.A.2. The requisite information for noninstitutional customers includes net
worth, tax status, and investment objectives. See id.
73. While their involvement in derivatives dealings has been strictly limited in the past,
banks have recently become the most significant dealers in the marketplace. See Goldman,
supra note 18, at 1115.
74. See id. at 1121-22. The majority of banking activity is regulated by these agencies. See
id.
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dealings for banks.75 Section Cl of Banking Circular 277 ("BC 277")
specifically requires that before any derivative is sold, the dealer bank
must assess whether or not the sale is consistent with the counterpar-
ties' objectives and financial position.76 This provision was not en-
acted with a suitability requirement in mind,77 but rather serves to
protect the bank by ensuring that a customer investing in derivatives
has the proper financial means and objectives, so as to not pose a
credit risk to the bank.78 This is because a bank's "credit and reputa-
tion risk" may increase should an inappropriate derivatives deal tran-
spire. 79 Additionally, a bank will "rarely" benefit from proceeding
with a transaction not understood by the customer, or one in which
that customer "assum[es] too much risk."'80 The provision itself re-
quires banks to "ensure that its counterparty 'understands the general
market risk profile of the derivative transaction' and [to] 'identify if a
proposed derivatives transaction is consistent with a counterparty's
policies and procedures with respect to derivatives activities, as they
are known to the bank."81 Additionally, "[t]he bank... should 'un-
derstand the applicability' of derivatives to 'the risks the bank cus-
tomer is attempting to manage."' 82
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency recently per-
formed a review of the sales practices of the largest national bank
derivatives dealers. The primary goal of this review was to determine
the banks' compliance with BC 277.83 The majority of banks surveyed
did indeed seem to make customer appropriateness a primary concern
of their credit policy.84 Furthermore, the management of these major
banks reflects a relationship-oriented philosophy rather than a trans-
75. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, REVIEW OF THE SALES PRAC-
TICES OF THE LARGEST NATIONAL BANK DERIVATIVES DEALERS, at 2 (June 7, 1995).
76. See id. The bank must make this assessment based on its knowledge of the
counterparty's policies and procedures for entering into derivatives contracts. See id.
77. In fact, the OCC has emphasized that nothing in BC 277 prevents banks from selling
derivatives to unsophisticated customers. See Daniel G. Schmedlen, Jr., Note, Broker-Dealer
Sales Practice in Derivatives Transactions: A Survey and Evaluation of Suitability Requirements,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1441, 1465-66 (1995).
78. See COMPTROLLER, supra note 76, at 2-3.
79. See Bahlke, supra note 7, § II.A.4(a)(7).
80. John P.C. Duncan, Counterparties Are Customers, Too, AM. BANKER, June 26, 1995, at
26.
81. Patrikis, supra note 15, § III.A (quoting OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CUR-
RENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, OCC BANKING CIRCULAR 277 (Oct.
27, 1993)).
82. Id.
83. See COMPTROLLER, supra note 75, at 1. A secondary objective was to "develop a set of
[b]est [p]ractices" to serve as a guide for banks. Id.
84. See id. at 3. Most banks had some formalized "know thy customer" policy, along with
self-policing systems and ongoing training programs. See id. at 1. Additionally, these banks
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action-oriented approach. 5 Such an approach reflects the notion that
banks seem more concerned with developing solid, long-term relation-
ships with their customers, rather than simply churning out as many
derivatives transactions as possible.86
Credit officers are usually the banking officials responsible for
determining customer appropriateness. 87 The necessary information
is normally obtained through standard questionnaires and customer
profiles.88 Such standardized documentation, however, does not al-
ways disclose the requisite information.8 9 While this is a problem with
individual investors, it is especially difficult with large corporations,
which often have volumes of information. 90 This calls for significant
cooperation from corporate managers, who must be willing to disclose
and perhaps explain confidential information.91
Aside from disclosure problems, the findings of the OCC's per-
formance review seem to indicate that banks are complying with BC
277 and taking proper steps to ensure derivatives transactions are ap-
propriate for their clients. Thus, although the OCC did not enact BC
277 as a suitability requirement, it effectively serves to operate as one,
and indeed, one that appears to work. Given the frequent complexity
of the transaction involved, the wide range of client sophistication,
and the dramatic growth within the financial community of the use of
derivatives, one might expect that the market would welcome the de-
velopment of any sort of regulatory guidance. Nevertheless, some ar-
gue that the scattered legislation coming from a multitude of
administrative organizations is not comprehensive enough to have a
lasting effect on the regulation of derivatives transactions, and that
these regulations, in their existing form, may be causing more confu-
sion than protection. This has prompted several organizations to re-
spond with broadly sweeping alternative regulations.
insist they would not allow an inappropriate transaction to go through, even if requested by the
customer. See id. at 3.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. Appropriateness, as in ensuring that the customer and derivatives transaction
are suitably matched.
88. See id. at 4.
89. Interview with Shmulik Levy, IDF Corp., in Talpiyot, Cal. (Jan. 2, 1996).
90. See id.
91. This information includes financial capacity, business characteristics, and corporate
goals. See COMPTROLLER, supra note 75, at 5.
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III. PROPOSED CHANGES
As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, the financial commu-
nity traditionally viewed corporations as sophisticated investors.
92
Apparently little has been learned, however, from the multitude of
corporations reporting losses from derivatives. 93  Even so,
"[d]erivatives are here to stay,"'94 and the potential for loss is great. A
recent survey conducted by the accounting firm of Ernst & Young dis-
covered that seventy-five percent of the companies polled 95 did not
employ independent risk-management teams. 96 Furthermore, fifty-
five percent of these companies fully authorize traders to use deriva-
tives on behalf of the company.97
In crafting a workable suitability requirement, several basic build-
ing blocks must be established. For example, upon which party should
the burden fall in determining whether a particular derivative is suita-
ble? Should the burden be equally shared, or should the parties be
required to negotiate this burden themselves?
John P.C. Duncan,98 in a report to the Task Force on Derivatives
of the Banking Law Committee, suggests four alternate standards re-
garding the appropriateness of derivatives transactions. 99 The first
suggested standard has been termed by Duncan an "Advisor/Fiduci-
ary" standard. Under this proposed level of regulation, "[a] dealer
must (a) obtain all customer information reasonably required to de-
termine whether a transaction is in the best interests of the institu-
tional customer and (b) refrain from a transaction with a customer
that does not appear to be in the customer's best interests." 100
This seems to reflect "the current standard applicable to ... advi-
sors and ... fiduciaries when exercising investment discretion on be-
92. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
93. See Andrew McIntosh, In Defence of Derivatives; They Reduce Risk, Ontario Investor
Says, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Sept. 22, 1995, at C1.
94. Patricia Murphy, Vice President of Fixed Income Trading, Ontario Teachers' Pension
Plan Board, Address Before the Canadian International Futures and Options Conference (Sept.
21, 1995), quoted in McIntosh, supra note 93, at C1.
95. The survey included 143 investment firms in the United States, Britain, France, and
Ireland that together manage over $535 billion. See Sesit, supra note 48, at 13.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Partner at Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (Chicago Office).
99. See John P.C. Duncan, Discussion Materials Prepared for Task Force on Derivatives of
the Banking Law Committee, A.B.A. Ann. Meeting, Chicago, I11. (Aug. 7, 1995).
100. Id. at 1. This would likely be "an overstatement of the current standards appl[ied] to...
investment advisor[s] who .. .recommend," but do not have discretion to affect, derivative
transactions. Id.
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half of their customers."'101 While adoption of this approach on an
industry-wide basis may reduce losses by uninformed investors, a suit-
ability requirement modelled after this standard would very likely
place too great a financial burden on the parties to make it effective.
Banks would have increased costs resulting from the affirmative duty
to gather information, which would in turn simply be passed on to the
customers-the corporations themselves. This standard also presup-
poses that all corporations desire, or should desire, such protection
irrespective of its increased costs.
The second proposed alternative, modified suitability, suggests
that "a dealer should obtain and consider the information reasonably
necessary to determine whether an institutional customer is sophisti-
cated regarding a proposed transaction."'01 2 If the dealer finds the cus-
tomer is sophisticated, the transaction may be entered into at arm's-
length; 03 otherwise, the dealer should either deny the transaction or
become an advisor.104
The goal of this alternative is to place "the burden on the
dealer[s] to obtain [the necessary] information," rather than simply
allowing them to rely on the information provided by the customer. 05
Also, it requires banks to take on the role of an advisor, should a
seemingly unsophisticated party wish to do business with them. This
is a role many banks may be willing to take on, and yet a role that
many corporations would not wish to pay.
Duncan's third alternative is a modified arm's-length standard:
"Unless unreasonable to do so based on information possessed by
dealer representatives participating in a proposed transaction, the
dealer may assume the institutional customer is sophisticated and
enter into the transaction at arm's-length.' 10 6
Such an alternative moves away from placing an obligation on the
dealer to obtain information from the customer, and instead creates
an assumption that the customer is indeed sophisticated. This benefits
dealers in that, unless there is information to the contrary, they may
assume the investor is sophisticated and thereby shift the responsibil-
ity-and the consequences-of a failure to disclose pertinent informa-
tion to the client. Moreover, although it may seem to take away
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2.
103. See id. This of course applies absent some other written agreement between the parties.
See id.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 5.
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investors' protection, it may very well encourage corporations or
other investors to disclose all of this pertinent information to the
dealer regarding their trading sophistication, so that dealers them-
selves will be able to evaluate the investors' sophistication knowing
"all the facts."
The final alternative proposed by Duncan is a traditional arm's-
length standard. Under this alternative, "[a] dealer may assume the
institutional customer is sophisticated and enter into any transaction
at arm's length (unless the dealer agrees in writing with the customer
on a different understanding of the relationship).' 10 7
This standard represents the current law applicable to derivatives
dealers only recommending transactions to institutional customers,
and not acting in an advisory or fiduciary capacity. Under this stan-
dard, protection is not automatically provided. In the event that cus-
tomers desire additional protection, they can contract with the dealer
to alter their relationship to include the proper investment advice. 108
While it eliminates protection afforded the institutional customer by
providing an assumption of sophistication, at the same time this stan-
dard seems to advocate a free market approach - one absent of regu-
lation in which customers decide for themselves how much assistance
is needed.
The private sector has also proposed regulation of its own in an
attempt to avoid harsh governmental regulation. 109 Many of these
proposals come from the Group of Thirty, a respected group of "end-
users, dealers, academics, accountants, and lawyers involved in inter-
national financial markets." 1 0 Their recommendations call for an "in-
dependent market and credit risk-management function.""' This
would presumably require a dealer's "analysis of the reasonableness
of the proposed activities in relation to the organization's overall fi-
nancial condition and capital levels.""112
With alternative regulatory suggestions coming from both the
public and private sector, it may be difficult to reach an agreed upon
standard. The suggested standards set forth above encompass broad
107. Id. at 6.
108. See id.
109. See Joseph L. Motes III, A Primer on the Trade and Regulation of Derivative Instru-
ments, 49 SMU L. REV. 579, 615-16 (1996) (quoting Letter from Frank Newman, Deputy Secre-
tary of the Treasury, to Henry B. Gonzalez, Chairman, House Banking Committee; citing 26
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1280 (1994)).
110. Duncan & Quinn, supra note 58, at 47.
111. Horwitz, supra note 6, at 44.
112. Id.
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alternatives, ranging from placing the burden for determining suitabil-
ity on the dealers themselves, to shifting this burden to corporate cli-
ents by assuming client sophistication sufficient to comprehend
transactions without the assistance or advice of dealers. Thus, crafting
the "ideal" standard requires a detailed analysis of this spectrum of
proffered alternatives.
IV. ANALYSIS
While corporate losses from derivatives transactions have be-
come more prevalent, the injection of regulatory protection into the
marketplace will not cure existing problems. This is because it was not
the absence of regulation that led to these large derivatives losses, but
rather the continuing absence of internal corporate controls, and the
ineffectiveness of corporate executives seeking outside advice when
needed. Private organizations on both sides of derivatives transac-
tions have undertaken voluntary steps to remedy these ongoing
problems, which until recently, did not manifest themselves in the
form of such large monetary losses. While industry experts may not
be in favor of a strict suitability requirement, the proposed reform
may nevertheless represent a "necessary, welcome, and thoughtful ef-
fort to enhance market participant understanding." 113
For example, the Derivatives Policy Group, comprised of six lead-
ing derivatives dealers, recently adopted a voluntary framework for
acceptable "rules of practice" applicable to derivative dealers like
themselves. 114 Four basic principles support this framework, the first
being the implementation of management control. This requires
"'comprehensive' internal risk management control systems" that ad-
dress a diverse genre of risks.115 Enhanced reporting of derivative-
related information, and evaluation of risk in relation to capital, are
among the other disclosures to be made under the recommended
guidelines." 16
Despite such suggestions, one can hardly argue that Fortune 500
companies such as P&G lack the resources necessary to evaluate their
financial positions. P&G itself has acknowledged that it "maintains
internal controls which are designed to provide reasonable assurance
that transactions are executed as authorized and accurately recorded
113. See Bahlke, supra note 7, at Exhibit B.
114. See Wander et al., supra note 50, § VII.B.
115. See id. These risks include market, credit, liquidity, legal, and operational risks. See id.
116. See id.
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and that assets are properly safeguarded. 11 7 In a letter to Arthur
Levitt,118 Jack Fields, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications and Finance, agrees that "[s]ophisticated investors must
not be relieved of their own obligation to manage and supervise their
investment strategies. '"" 9 Indeed, it seems that many corporate inves-
tors want to "have [their] cake and eat it too: [they] want the benefits
[of their] good investments, but not the "losses" from their bad
ones. 20 Although this is not an entirely unique legal strategy, lawyers
seem to be seeking "victim status" for their corporate clients, no mat-
ter how large or small.' 2'
A distinction must be made, however, between corporate giants
such as P&G, and closely held corporations, where stock ownership is
not widely dispersed and a few shareholders are in control of corpo-
rate policy. Although P&G's lawsuit filed against Banker's Trust was
likely an important impetus to regulators wishing to re-examine the
need for corporate protection from poor investment advice, P&G,
number thirteen on the Fortune 500 list,122 may actually serve as a bad
example of corporations requiring such protection. This is apparent
simply by examining the company's 1995 annual report in which it
reported net sales of over $30 billion 123 and net earnings of $2.7
billion.124
Like other investors though, corporations will continue to make
and lose money, regardless of their size. Thus, an across-the-board
rule applying to organizations based on incorporation will not accom-
plish the proper regulatory objectives. Although corporate status car-
ries with it many privileges and protections, 25 it hardly seems
reasonable to presume that simply by becoming incorporated, an or-
ganization suddenly becomes an entity in need of special protection.
This would surely be advantageous to corporations that would be able
to shield themselves from derivatives losses in many instances, simply
117. PROCER & GAMBLE, supra note 35, at 23.
118. Chairman of the SEC.
119. Letter from Jack Fields, Chairman, Subcommittee on Television and Finance, to Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, reprinted in Bahlke, supra note 7, at
Exhibit B. Fields means for this comment to apply absent a fiduciary relationship between the
customer and dealer-bank. See id.
120. Markham, supra note 4, at 361.
121. Id. at 363.
122. See PRocraER & GAMBLE, supra note 35, at 2.
123. See PRocmR & GAMBLE CO., 1995 Annual Report 1, 24 (1996).
124. See id. These earnings do not include the $102 million charge against 1993 and 1994 net
earnings related to P&G's losses from two interest rate swaps. See id. at 27 n.1.
125. Examples of such privileges and protections of incorporation would respectively be the
increased ability to raise funds and the limited liability of shareholders.
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by labeling the instrument sold to them as unsuitable. This could lead
to further frivolous litigation.
Any adopted standard must be a subjective one, to be applied on
a case-by-case basis, to a highly diverse group of corporate derivative
end-users. In light of industrial giants like P&G, such a standard may
be especially appropriate considering that many smaller investors are
increasingly finding their resources are not sufficient to allow them to
analyze and monitor derivatives transactions. As a result, these par-
ties are often forced to hire additional personnel, or more commonly,
obtain supplementary expertise by contracting with a third party.126
For this reason, any call for protection must include an assess-
ment of the true complexity of derivatives. It is arguable that aside
from some exotic transactions, derivatives are not as complex a secur-
ity as they appear to be. This perception is consistent with the notion
that the problem may not be derivatives themselves, but rather the
investment executives who misuse them in unadvised bids to make
quick money instead of using them for risk management. Herein may
lie the real danger because any security can prove dangerous when
misused. 127 Corporations, however, unlike individual investors, often
have built-in market incentives which prevent them from engaging in
such speculation. These might include a decline in the corporation's
stock price, shareholder dissatisfaction, and the fear of losing one's
job.
Responding to the alleged complexity of derivatives, one industry
expert stated that "[i]f derivatives are not used because they appear
complex, it's a rather feeble excuse. ' 128 Indeed, it has been suggested
that with the right information, any counterparty should be able to
make a decision as to the appropriateness of a derivatives transac-
tion.' 29 However, it should be noted that all corporations might not
have access to such information. Thus, instead of enacting suitability
rules, a better approach might be to focus on the issue of disclosure. 30
This would require the dealer to inform investing corporations of how
much they stand to gain or lose in different scenarios. Of course, the
issue would still exist as to whether once this information is disclosed
the dealer is relieved of all liability; and whether the burden is then
126. See Markham, supra note 4, at 383.
127. See Fisher, supra note 34.
128. Murphy, supra note 94.
129. See Jane Carlin, Remarks at the 18th Annual Commodities Law Institute and the 4th
Annual Financial Services Law Institute (Oct. 19, 1995) (Morgan Stanley & Co.).
130. See Unsuitable, supra note 12, at 18.
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shifted to corporations that must, with this disclosed information, de-
termine for themselves whether a derivative investment is indeed
suitable.
Up to this point, most of the legal claims filed against dealers by
end-users such as P&G and Gibson Greetings have been based on a
theory that the derivatives dealer breached some type of fiduciary
duty. 131 Liability under a suitability rule would presumably not re-
quire any such relationship to exist. There certainly must be some due
diligence requirement on the part of corporate end-users though, for
even effective regulation "cannot substitute for effective manage-
ment."'1 32 In fact, one industry expert suggests that the Bankers Trust
cases discussed above would not exist, absent a failure on the part of
P&G and Gibson Greetings to effectively supervise personnel through
an adequate set of internal controls.' 33 Another issue related to the
enactment of a suitability rule is that it would "undermine the finality"
of derivatives transactions.1M This in turn may "create ... uncertainty
regarding the economic risk position" of investors.135
Perhaps the best approach is to return to the basic principles un-
derlying contract law. The simplest solution indeed involves the basic
principles of contract law, and would have the parties work out the
terms of their relationship before doing business. This provides pri-
vate autonomy to the parties, allowing them to determine for them-
selves how much protection they wish to subscribe to. In a perfect
world, parties would work out these details in advance, and a default
rule shifting responsibility to either party would not be necessary, nor
would this Note. Unfortunately, this is not the case, probably in part
due to the fact that investors often do not anticipate the serious losses
which can occur in derivatives transactions. As already established
131. See Carla E. Craig & Daniel Hume, "Nightmare 2-Customers" Recent Litigation Be-
tween Derivatives Dealers and Their Customers Involving Issues of Fraud, Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, Suitability, etc., and Regulator and Industry Response, § III.B(1) (PLI Commercial Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4492, 1995).
132. Horwitz & Mackay, supra note 42, at 14 (quoting Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Derivative Product Activities of Commercial Banks: Joint Study Conducted in Re-
sponse to Questions Posed by Senator Riegle on Derivative Products, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 27,
1993)).
133. See Managing Director Donald L. Horwitz, The Woodward Group, Remarks at the 18th
Annual Commodities Law Institute and the 4th Annual Financial Services Law Institute (Oct.
19, 1995) (notes on file with author).
134. Ernest T. Patrikis & Diane L. Virzera, Over-the-Counter Derivatives Sales Practices:
Disclosure, Suitability, Appropriateness, and "Best Practices," available in WESTLAW, PLI
Database, 912 PLI/Corp. 309 (1995).
135. Id.
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though, "[w]hen the customer does not understand a transaction or is
clearly assuming too much risk, it will rarely benefit the bank to pro-
ceed with the transaction."'1 36 For this reason, banks retain an incen-
tive to ensure that customers do not enter into inappropriate
transactions, regardless of what course of action regulators take.137
The scenario in which all parties seem to benefit most effectively
is indeed a deregulated market; one in which parties themselves de-
cide how much protection to include in their sales contract. Given the
diverse structures, assets, and objectives of the many existing corpora-
tions, devising a broad standard to be universally applied would be a
virtual impossibility. Adopting a free-market approach, however,
would permit those parties wishing to reap the benefits of deregula-
tion able to do so by acting on their own merits and relying on their
own resources to guide their investments. On the other hand, those
corporations in need of sound investment advice can simply enter into
such an agreement with their derivatives dealer. This allows compa-
nies currently benefitting from relaxed regulation to continue to enjoy
these benefits, while at the same time allowing those needing protec-
tion to seek it out themselves. 138 A suitability rule would unnecessa-
rily alter the traditional "arms-length" relationship between dealers
and investors. Furthermore, markets function most efficiently when
the parties to a transaction are able to enter into the deal without a
duty to "serve the interests of their counterparties."'1 39
In several studies conducted by industry experts, all of those sur-
veyed agreed that "the most important line of defense for ensuring
that the risks of derivatives are limited is a 'conscious and disciplined'
approach to risk management based on sound principles and prac-
tices.' 140 Even if a suitability requirement were enacted, determining
a derivative's suitability for a corporation may be extremely difficult
and, at best, would represent the bank's subjective opinion.' 41 In ad-
dition, the duties required by a suitability rule would also create re-
sponsibilities that are "unavoidably vague in scope and conflict with
the arm's length nature of [t]ransactions."'1 42 What may make such an
136. Duncan, supra note 80, at 26.
137. See id.
138. Certain agencies in fact encourage investors to seek independent investment advice
when they are unwilling or unable to take responsibility for their own decisions. See Patrikis &
Virzera, supra note 134.
139. Schmedlen, supra note 77, at 1472.
140. Horwitz & Mackay, supra note 42, at 15.
141. See Unsuitable, supra note 12, at 18.
142. Patrikis & Virzera, supra note 134.
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assessment even more difficult is the unwillingness of many corpora-
tions to disclose the closely-held information necessary for making
such a determination. 143 Although banks will already possess certain
information about their customers, corporations will be forced to re-
veal even more confidential information, such as detailed product
data, long and short-term goals, and other information, which if
leaked, could hurt that corporation's competitive edge.144
It is also unlikely that many corporations would be willing to bear
the increased costs which dealer-banks would be forced to implement
in the wake of facing liability from potential lawsuits. And, paradoxi-
cally, if corporations are afforded increased protections, they may
have incentives to take bigger speculatory risks, or be less likely to
inform themselves of the risk, knowing that should they suffer losses
they may have statutory recourse against the dealer. 145
For these reasons, regulators should be wary of enacting suitabil-
ity regulation, which would create unneeded incentives for banks to
ensure derivatives transactions are appropriate, mainly because these
incentives are already in place through the form of self-enacted regu-
lations such as BC 277. Additionally, such regulation would infringe
upon the free will of corporations to decide how much investment ad-
vice or assistance they require. By allowing the parties to a deriva-
tives transaction the ability to decide for themselves how much
protection and advice are bargained for, corporations can apply their
own test as to the benefits of additional protection, and the costs they
are willing to pay for it.
CONCLUSION
When used properly, derivatives are an essential tool in the man-
agement of risk. Yet when used without certain precautions, in an
unsupervised manner, derivatives may only serve to increase existing
risk and create new risk. The existence of a suitability standard, one
which would require banks to determine whether transactions are ap-
propriate for the corporations entering into them, would not offer the
same advantages to all corporations. This is in part because corpora-
tions are too diverse a group to enact this type of regulatory protec-
143. See Unsuitable, supra note 12, at 18. This includes information which is not required to
be disclosed in the corporation's annual report, which is governed by generally accepted ac-
counting principles.
144. See Telephone Interview with Whitney L. Keer, The Natural Group (Oct. 15, 1995)
(notes on file with author).
145. See Unsuitable, supra note 12, at 18.
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tion which will apply simply upon a company's filing for
incorporation.
By allowing corporations to operate in an environment free of
such regulation, each corporation can make a determination for itself
as to whether additional protection is required. If a corporation de-
cides outside investment advice is needed, it can simply enter into a
fiduciary or contractual relationship with a securities dealer that will
provide these desired services. At the same time, this allows those
benefitting from deregulation to continue to reap those benefits. Fi-
nally, it has been suggested that perhaps corporations should enact
their own suitability test, one applied to its executives and the dealers
selling them securities. 146
146. See id. What seems to really be suggested is that corporate officers determine whether
executives are making the proper decisions, and whether the dealers selling them securities are
providing them with suitable advice and services.
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